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Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrium pricing of asset shares in the presence of dynamic private
information. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent who observes the firm value,
noise traders, and competitive market makers who set share prices using the total order flow as
a noisy signal of the insider’s information. I provide a characterization of all optimal strategies,
and prove existence of both Markovian and non Markovian equilibria by deriving closed form
solutions for the optimal order process of the informed trader and the optimal pricing rule of
the market maker. The consideration of non Markovian equilibrium is relevant since the market
maker might decide to re-weight past information after receiving a new signal. Also, I show
that a) there is a unique Markovian equilibrium price process which allows the insider to trade
undetected, and that b) the presence of an insider increases the market informational efficiency,
in particular for times close to dividend payment.
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1 Introduction
Although financial markets with informational asymmetries have been widely discussed in the
market microstructure literature (see [5] and [13] for a review), the characterization of the optimal
trading strategy of an investor who posses superior information has been, until lately, largely
unaddressed by the mathematical finance literature.
In recent years, with the development of enlargement of filtrations theory (see [11]), models of
so called insider trading have been gaining attention in mathematical finance as well (see e.g. [1],
[4] and [9]). The salient assumptions of these models are that i) the informational advantage of
the insider is a functional of the stock price process (e.g. the insider might know in advance the
maximum value the stock price will achieve), and that ii) the insider does not affect the stock price
dynamics. But in fact, since equilibrium stock prices should clear the market, and thus depend
on the future random demand of market participants, assuming that the informational advantage
of the insider is a functional of the price process implies that she either knows the future demand
processes of all market participants, or she knows that the price will – exogenously – converge to a
fundamental that is known to her. Since the assumption of an omniscient insider is unrealistic, one
would have to assume the latter. Nevertheless, since the presence of an insider – by assumption in
these models– does not affect the price process, this raises the question of what makes the price
converge to its fundamental value without information being released to the market.
Thus, from the market microstructure point of view, these modeling assumptions translate
into i) imposing strong efficiency of the markets even without an insider providing, through her
trading, information to the market – that is, assuming a priori that the price will converge to the
fundamental value – and that ii) the less informed agents are not fully rational, since they do not
try to infer the insider’s private signal from market data (since there is no feedback from insider
trading to equilibrium price).
Part of the mathematical finance literature has tried to address these shortcomings by consider-
ing the informational content of stock prices, and optimal information-based trading, in a rational
expectations equilibrium framework (see e.g. [2], [7]). In these models – to preserve tractability –
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the private information of the insider has been generally assumed to be static. For example, in [2]
and in [7] the insider knows ex ante the final value of the firm, and in [6] she knows ex ante the
time of default of the company issuing the asset. This literature has shown that i) the presence
of an insider on the market does not necessarily lead to arbitrage (i.e. the value function of the
insider is finite), and that ii) the presence of insiders might be considered beneficial to the market,
in the sense that it leads to higher information efficiency of the equilibrium price process.
Nevertheless, the assumption of insider’s perfect foresight is unrealistic, since the fundamental
value of the firm should be connected to elements (like future cash-flows, productivity, sales etc.)
that have intrinsically an aleatory component. That is, a more natural assumption would be that
the fundamental value is in itself a stochastic process, and that the insider can observe it directly
– or at least observe it in a less noisy way than the other agents on the market.
Thus, in this paper I relax the assumption of static insider information, and study the equilib-
rium trading and price processes, as well as market efficiency, in a setting with dynamic private
information.
The model I consider in this paper is a generalization of the static information setting of [2].
An earlier attempt to generalize this framework to include dynamic information is in [3]. This
latter paper considers a much smaller set of admissible trading strategies and pricing rules, and
has much more stringent assumptions on the parameters, than the ones considered in my work.
Moreover, it shows the existence of one possible Markovian equilibrium, while my work characterizes
all optimal strategies and establishes that there is a unique Markovian inconspicuous equilibrium
price process, i.e. an equilibrium price that allows the insider to trade undetected and depends only
on the total order process. Moreover, I identify this Markovian equilibrium in closed form, and
show that the presence of an insider increases the market informational efficiency for times close to
dividend payment. Furthermore, I show that even when the market parameters do not satisfy the
conditions for the existence of a Markovian equilibrium, there exists a non Markovian inconspicuous
equilibrium which I also identify in closed form. Additionally, I give characterization of all optimal
trading strategies for the equilibrium price process. I show, based on this characterization, that in
the case of non Markovian price process it is optimal for the insider to reveal her private information
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not only at the terminal time, but also at some predefined interim times – thus bringing the market
to higher efficiency than in the case of Markovian price process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
assumptions. Existence of Markovian equilibrium, and uniqueness of the inconspicuous Markovian
equilibrium price process, are proved in Section 3. Existence of equilibrium for more general pricing
functionals is demonstrated in the Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model Setup
Consider a stock issued by a company with fundamental value given by the process Zt, defined on(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P
)
, and satisfying
Zt = v +
∫ t
0
σz(s)dB
1
s
where B1t is a standard Brownian motion on Ft, v is N(0, σ) independent of FB
1
t for any t, and
σz(s) a is deterministic function.
Then, if the firm value is observable, the fair stock price should be a function of Zt and t.
However, the assumption of the company value being discernable by the whole market in continuous
time is counterfactual, and it will be more realistic to assume that this information is revealed to
the market only at given time intervals (such as dividend payments times or when balance sheets
are publicized).
In this model I therefore assume, without loss of generality, that the time of the next information
release is t = 1, and the market terminates after that.1 Hence, in this setting the stock can be
viewed as a European option on the firm value with maturity T = 1 and payoff f(Z1). In addition to
this risky asset, there is a riskless asset that yields an interest rate normalized to zero for simplicity
of exposition. In what follows it is assumed that all random variables are defined on the same
stochastic basis
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P
)
.
The microstructure of the market, and the interaction of market participants, is modeled as a
1This is without loss of generality, since the extension to multiple information release times is straightforward.
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generalization of [2]. There are three types of agents: noisy/liquidity traders, an informed trader
(insider), and competitive market makers, all of whom are risk neutral. The agents differ in their
information sets, and objectives, as follows.
• Noisy/liquidity traders trade for liquidity reasons, and their total demand at time t is given
by a standard Brownian motion B2t independent of B
1 and v.
• Market makers observe only the total market order process Yt = θt+B2t , where θt is the total
order of the insider, i.e. their filtration is FMt = F¯Yt . Since they are competitive and risk
neutral, on the basis of the observed information they set the price as
P
(
Y[0,t], t
)
= Pt = E
[
f(Z1)|FMt
]
. (2.1)
As in [7], I assume that market makers set the price as a function of weighted total order
process at time t, i.e. I consider pricing functionals P
(
Y[0,t], t
)
of the following form
P
(
Y[0,t], t
)
= H
(∫ t
0
w(s)dYs, t
)
.
where w(s) is some positive deterministic function.
• The informed investor observes the price process Pt = H(
∫ t
0 w(s)dYs, t) and the true firm
value Zt, i.e. her filtration is given by FIt = F¯Z,Pt . Since she is risk-neutral, her objective is
to maximize the expected final wealth, i.e.
sup
θ∈A(H,w)
E
[
Xθ1
]
= sup
θ∈A(H,w)
E
[
(f(Z1)− P1)θ1 +
∫ 1
0
θs−dPs
]
(2.2)
where A(H,w) is the set of admissible trading strategies for the given price functional
H
(∫ t
0 w(s)dYs, t
)
which will be defined later. That is, the insider maximizes the expected
value of her final wealth Xθ1 , where the first term on the right hand side of equation (2.2) is the
contribution to the final wealth due to a potential differential between price and fundamental
at the time of information release, and the second term is the contribution to final wealth
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coming from the trading activity.
Note that setting σz ≡ 0, the resulting market would be the static information one considered
by [2].
Note also that the above market structure implies that the insider’s optimal trading strategy
takes into account the feedback effect i.e. the that prices react to her trading strategy according
to equation (2.1). Identifying the optimal insider’s strategy is equivalent to the problem of finding
the rational expectations equilibrium of this market, i.e. a pair consisting of an admissible price
functional and an admissible trading strategy such that: a) given the price functional the trad-
ing strategy is optimal, and b) given the trading strategy the price functional satisfies (2.1). To
formalize this definition, we first need to define the sets of admissible pricing rules and trading
strategies.
Although it is standard in the insider trading literature to limit the set of admissible strategies
to absolutely continuous ones, in what follows I consider a much broader class of strategies given
by the set of semimartingales satisfying some standard technical conditions that eliminate doubling
strategies. The formal definition of the set of admissible trading strategies is summarized in the
following definition.
Definition 2.1 An insider’s trading strategy, θt, is admissible for a given pricing rule (H(y, t), w(t))
(θ ∈ A(H,w)) if θt is FIt adapted semimartingale, and no doubling strategies are allowed i.e.
E
[∫ 1
0
H2
(∫ t
0
w(s)dθs− +
∫ t
0
w(s)dB2s , t
)
dt
]
<∞. (2.3)
Moreover, we call the insider’s trading strategy inconspicuous if Yt = θt+B
2
t is a Brownian motion
on its own filtration FYt (since in this case the presence of the insider is undetectable).
Remark 2.1 An equilibrium in which the optimal insider’s trading strategy is inconspicuous is a
desirable feature of any insider trading model, and I will show that in this setting such an equilibrium
exists. In fact, given the potentially high cost associated with being identified as an insider, it might
be reasonable to consider only this type of equilibrium.
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The definition of admissible pricing rules is a generalization of the one in [2]2 with additional
regularity condition 5 below which insures that, given the market maker’s filtration, the total order
process has finite variance. This generalization allows the market maker to re-weight her past
information.
Definition 2.2 A pair of measurable functions, H ∈ C2,1(R × [0, 1]), H : R × [0, 1] → R and
w : [0, 1]→ R+\{0}, is an admissible pricing rule ((H,w) ∈ H) if and only if:
1. The weighting function, w(t), is a piecewise positive constant function given by
w(t) =
n∑
i=1
σiy1{t∈(ti−1 ,ti]} (2.4)
where 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = 1 and
∑n
i=1(σ
i
y)
2 = 1.
This condition doesn’t cause loss of generality because: a) it was shown by [7], in the static
private information case, that in the equilibrium w′(t) = 0 and b) it is always possible to
re-scale w to have
∑n
i=1(σ
i
y)
2 = 1.
2. E
[∫ 1
0 H
2(
∫ t
0 w(s)dB
2
s , t)dt
]
<∞.
3. E
[
H2(
∫ 1
0 w(s)dB
2
s , 1)
]
<∞.
The two conditions above, together with equation(2.3), rule out doubling strategies.
4. y → H(y, t) is increasing for each fixed t, that is the price increases if the stock demand
increases.
5. E
[(
h−1i
(
E
[
f(Z1)|FZti
]))2]
<∞ where h−1i is the inverse of H(y, ti).
Moreover, H is a rational pricing rule if, for a given θ, it satisfies
H
(∫ t
0
w(s)dYs, t
)
= E
[
f(Z1)|FMt
]
.
2Setting w(s) ≡ 1 will make conditions 2-4 exactly the same as in [2]
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Remark 2.2 Due to condition 4 on the admissible pricing rules, the insider can infer the total
order process from the price process by inverting H(
∫ t
0 w(s)dYs, t) = Pt. Therefore, since I will
be considering rational expectations equilibria, and because w(s) is strictly positive, she can infer
the total order process Yt and, since she knows her own total order process θt, she can deduce
B2t = Yt − θt from it. As a consequence, the filtration of the insider can be written as FIt =
FB2,Zt = FB
2,B1
t ∨ σ(v), where σ(v) is the sigma algebra generated by the random variable v.
Given these definitions of admissible pricing rules and trading strategies, it is now possible to
formally define the market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2.3 A pair ((H∗, w∗), θ∗) is an equilibrium if (H∗, w∗) is an admissible pricing rule,
θ∗ is admissible strategy, and:
1. Given θ∗, (H∗, w∗) is a rational pricing rule, i.e. it satisfies
H
(∫ t
0
w(s)dYs, t
)
= E
[
f(Z1)|FMt
]
.
2. Given (H∗, w∗), θ∗ solves the optimization problem
supθ∈A(H∗,w∗)E
[
(f(Z1)− P1)θ1 +
∫ 1
0
θs−dPs
]
Moreover, a pricing rule (H∗(y, t), w∗(t)) is an inconspicuous equilibrium pricing rule if there
exists an inconspicuous insider trading strategy θ∗ such that ((H∗, w∗), θ∗) is an equilibrium.
Additionally, to define a well behaved problem I impose the following technical conditions on
the model parameters.
Assumption 2.1 The fundamental value of the risky stock, F (z, t), given by
F (Zt, t) = E
[
f(Z1)|FZt
]
(2.5)
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is well defined and is a square integrable martingale, i.e.
E
[
f2(Z1)
]
<∞, (2.6)
and f (.) is an increasing function.
Assumption 2.2 The variance of the firm value, Σz(t) =
∫ t
0 σ
2
z(s)ds, is finite for any t.
Remark 2.3 Since the final payoff of the stock is given by f(Z1), the above assumption implies
that it is always possible to redefine the function f so that
σ2 = 1− Σz(1). (2.7)
In what follows, I will always assume that this equality holds.
3 The Markovian Equilibrium
In this section I address the problem of existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium given by Defini-
tion 2.3 in the case of Markovian pricing rule i.e. I consider w(t) ≡ 1. Before stating the main result
of this section, I need to impose additional conditions on the model to insure that the problem is
well-posed.
Assumption 3.1 For any t ∈ [0, 1) we have
∫ t
0
(
Σz(s) + σ
2 − s)−2 ds <∞ (3.1)
and either ∫ 1
0
(
Σz(s) + σ
2 − s)−2 ds <∞ (3.2)
or
lim
t→1
∫ t
0
1
|Σz(s) + σ2 − s|ds =∞ (3.3)
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The above assumption is needed for the filtering problem of the market maker to be well defined.
Assumption 3.2 There exists a t∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that
1− t >
∫ 1
t
σ2z(s)ds (3.4)
for any t ≥ t∗ and σz(t) is continuous on [t∗, 1].
Moreover, for all t ∈ [0, 1] we have
Σz(t)− t+ σ2 ≥ 0. (3.5)
This assumption insures that: a) close to the market terminal time, the insider’s signal is more
precise than the market maker’s (i.e. E
[(
Z1 − E
[
Z1|FMt
])2 |FMt ] > E [(Z1 − E [Z1|FIt ])2 |FIt ]),
and b) that the insider’s signal is always at least as precise as the market maker’s.
Remark 3.1 Notice that Assumptions 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 guarantee that when condition (3.2) is not
satisfied
λ(t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
1
Σz(s) + σ2 − sds
}
t→1−→ 0,
and that if Ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
1+σ2z (s)
λ2(s)
ds
t→1−→∞, then
lim
t→1
λ2(t)Ξ(t) log log (Ξ(t)) = 0. (3.6)
Furthermore, assumption 3.2 can be relaxed by replacing (3.4) with condition (3.6).
Proof. See Appendix A
Now we are in the position to state the main result of this section which is summarized in the
next theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied. Then the pair (H∗, θ∗),
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where H∗ satisfies
Ht(y, t) +
1
2
Hyy(y, t) = 0 (3.7)
H(y, 1) = f(y), (3.8)
i.e. H∗(y, t) = E
[
f(y +B21 −B2t )
]
and
θ∗t =
∫ t
0
Zs − Ys
Σz(s)− s+ σ2ds, (3.9)
is an equilibrium. Moreover, the pricing rule H∗ is the unique inconspicuous equilibrium pricing
rule in H. Furthermore, given this pricing rule H∗, the trading strategy θ∗ is optimal in A(H∗) for
the insider if and only if
1. The process θ∗t is continuous and has bounded variation.
2. The total order, Y ∗t = θ
∗
t +B
2
t , satisfies Y
∗
1 = Z1.
Therefore, when the parameters of the market satisfy the stated assumptions, there exists a unique
Markovian pricing rule such that: a) at least one optimal trading strategy of the insider, given by
(3.9), is increasing market efficiency during all trading periods since the insider pushes the price
to the fundamental value of the stock, b) due to 1, the variance of the risky asset is not influenced
by insider’s trading if she trades optimally, and c) the insider presence increases market efficiency
close to the market termination time due to 2.
I will prove this theorem in three propositions that focus on different aspects of the equilibrium.
In particular, the propositions will address: a) characterization of the optimal insider trading
strategy, b) existence of the equilibrium, and c) uniqueness of the inconspicuous pricing rule.
The conclusion of Theorem 3.1 is driven by the following result: for any pricing rule in H
satisfying equation (3.7), there exists a finite upper bound on the informed agent’s value function
which is attained by a trading strategy which is not detectable by the market maker, not locally
correlated with noisy trades, and such that all the private information is revealed only at time t = 1.
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Thus, this result gives the characterization of the optimal insider’s trading strategy in a slightly
more general form than stated in Theorem 3.1. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied. Then, given an
admissible pricing rule H ∈ H satisfying the partial differential equation (PDE) (3.7), an admissible
trading strategy θ∗ ∈ A(H) is optimal for the insider if and only if:
1. The process θ∗t is continuous and has bounded variation.
2. The total order, Y ∗t = θ
∗
t +B
2
t , satisfies
h (Y ∗1 ) = H(Y
∗
1 , 1) = f (Z1) , (3.10)
where h(y) = H(y, 1) and f(Z1) is the final payoff of the asset.
Proof.
(Sufficiency) For any admissible trading strategy, by using integration by parts for semimartingales ([14],
Corollary II.6.2, p. 68), we have
E
[
Xθ1
]
= E
[∫ 1
0
(F (Zs, s)−H(Ys−, s))dθs +
∫ 1
0
θs−dF (Zs, s) + [θ, F (Z, ·)−H(Y, ·)]1
]
.
By applying Itoˆ formula for semimartingales ([14], Theorem II.6.33, p. 81) to H(y, t) and
F (z, t), and using the fact that F (Zt, t) is a true martingale, we get
F (Zt, t) = F (z0, 0) +
∫ t
0
Fz(Zs, s)dZs
H(Yt, t) = H(0, 0) +
∫ t
0
Hy(Ys−, s)dYs +
∫ t
0
Ht(Ys−, s)ds
+
1
2
∫ t
0
Hyy(Ys−, s)d [Y ]s +
∑
s≤t
[∆H(Ys, s)−Hy(Ys−, s)∆Ys] .
Since Yt = θt+B
2
t , we have that [Y ]t = t+ 〈θc〉t+2
〈
θc, B2
〉
t
+
∑
s≤t (∆θs)
2. Therefore, using
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the fact that H(y, t) satisfies equation (3.7), we have that
H(Yt, t) = H(0, 0) +
∫ t
0
Hy(Ys−, s)dY
c
s +
1
2
∫ t
0
Hyy(Ys−, s)d 〈θc〉s
+
∫ t
0
Hyy(Ys−, s)d
〈
θc, B2
〉
s
+
∑
s≤t
∆H(Ys, s).
Therefore, by Theorem 26.6 of [8], and Theorem II.6.29 of [14], we have (notice that Zs and
B2t are continuous)
[θ, F (Z, ·)]1 =
∫ 1
0
Fz(Zs, s)d [θ
c, Z]s
[θ,H(Y, ·)]1 =
∫ 1
0
Hy(Ys−, s)d [θ
c]s +
∫ 1
0
Hy(Ys−, s)d
[
θc, B2
]
s
+
∑
s≤1
∆H(Ys, s)∆θs.
On the other hand, consider a function
J(y, z) =
∫ y∗(z)
y
(f(z)−H(x, 1)) dx,
where y∗(z) is the solution of H(y∗(z), 1) = f(z). Let
V (y, z, t) = E
[
J
(
y +B21 −B2t , z +
∫ 1
t
σz(s)dB
1
s
)]
. (3.11)
This function is well defined (it is easy to check that E
[|J(B21 , Z1)|] < ∞) and satisfies the
partial differential equation
Vt(y, z, t) +
1
2
Vyy(y, z, t) +
σ2z(t)
2
Vzz(y, z, t) = 0 (3.12)
with terminal condition V (y, z, 1) = J(y, z). Therefore V (y, z, 1) ≥ V (y∗(z), z, 1) = 0 for any
fixed z and any y 6= y∗(z). Moreover, since H(y, 1) is a nondecreasing continuous function of
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y, we can use the monotone convergence theorem to obtain
lim
∆→0+
V (y +∆, z, t) − V (y, z, t)
∆
= lim
∆→0+
E
[∫ y+B21−B2t
y+∆+B2
1
−B2t
(
f(z +
∫ 1
t
σz(s)dB
1
s )−H(x, 1)
)
dx
]
∆
= −F (z, t)− E

 lim
∆→0+
∫ y+B21−B2t
y+∆+B2
1
−B2t
H(x, 1)dx
∆


= E
[
H(y +B21 −B2t , 1)
]− F (z, t).
Thus, due to the definition of an admissible pricing rule, we have
lim
∆→0+
V (y +∆, z, t) − V (y, z, t)
∆
+ F (z, t) −H(y, t) = 0. (3.13)
The same argument can be applied to the left derivative of V with respect to y to obtain
Vy(y, z, t) + F (z, t) −H(y, t) = 0. (3.14)
As a consequence, we can express E
[
Xθ1
]
in terms of V as (notice that
∫ t
0 B
2
t dF (Zt, t) is a
martingale)
E
[
Xθ1
]
= E
[
−
∫ 1
0
Vy(Ys−, Zs, s)dθs −
∫ 1
0
Vz(Ys−, Zs, s)dZs −
∫ 1
0
Vzy(Ys−, Zs, s)d [θ
c, Z]s
−
∫ 1
0
Vyy(Ys−, Zs, s)d [θ
c]s −
∫ 1
0
Vyy(Ys−, Zs, s)d
[
θc, B2
]
s
−
∑
s≤1
∆Vy(Ys, Zs, s)∆θs

 .
On the other hand, by applying the Itoˆ formula for semimartingales to V directly ([14],
Theorem II.6.33, p. 81) we get
E [V (Y1, Z1, 1)] = E
[
V (0, Z0, 0) −Xθ1 +
∫ 1
0
Vy(Ys−, Zs, s)dB
2
s
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
Vyy(Ys−, Zs, s)d [θ
c]s +
∑
s≤1
[∆V (Ys, Zs, s)− Vy(Ys, Zs, s)∆Ys]

 .
Notice that, due to the definition of the fundamental value F and of admissible pricing rule
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H, we have E
[∫ 1
0 Vz(Ys, Zs, s)dB
2
s
]
= 0. Therefore
E
[
Xθ1
]
= E
[
V (0, Z0, 0)− V (Y1, Z1, 1)− 1
2
∫ 1
0
Vyy(Ys−, Zs, s)d [θ
c]s
+
∑
s≤1
[∆V (Ys, Zs, s)− Vy(Ys, Zs, s)∆Ys]

 .
Moreover, due to the properties of V we have
∑
s≤1
(∆V (Ys, Zs, s)− Vy(Ys, Zs, s)∆Ys) ≤ 0, (3.15)
−
∫ 1
0
Vyy(Ys, Zs, s)
2
d [θc]s ≤ 0, (3.16)
−V (1, Y1, Z1) ≤ −V (1, y∗(Z1), Z1). (3.17)
The above inequalities become equalities if and only if the following conditions hold: ∆θ = 0
for equation (3.15); [θc]1 = 0 for equation (3.16); H(Y
∗
1 , 1) = f (Z1) for equation (3.17).
Therefore, for any function V satisfying equations (3.12), (3.14) and the final condition given
by V (y, z, 1) ≥ V (y∗(z), z, 1) = 0 for every z and any y 6= y∗(z) (where y∗(z) is the solution
of H(y∗(z), 1) = f(z)), we have that
E
[
Xθ1
]
≤ V (0, Z0, 0).
This expression holds with equality if and only if θ is continuous and condition (3.10) is
satisfied. Hence, if θ is such that these conditions are satisfied, then it is optimal.
(Necessity) Consider the continuous martingale given by
Xt = G(Zt, t) = E
[
h−1(f(Z1))|FIt
]
.
This martingale is well defined since H is an admissible pricing rule.
Consider θt =
∫ t
0
Xs−Ys
1−s ds. In this case, we can solve the stochastic differential equation for
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Y to get
Yt = Xt − (1− t)
(
v +
∫ t
0
1
1− sdXs −
∫ t
0
1
1− sdB
2
s
)
.
Notice that Yt is continuous, therefore θt has bounded variation almost surely. Moreover,
H(Y1, 1) = f(Z1) almost surely, hence this choice of θ gives
E
[
Xθ1
]
= V (0, Z0, 0).
Since, by the sufficiency proof, we have that for any θ˜t which is either not continuous or does
not satisfy equation (3.10)
E
[
X θ˜1
]
< V (0, Z0, 0) = E
[
Xθ1
]
,
we know that any such θ˜t is not optimal.

From this characterization result, it follows that the θ∗t given by (3.9) is an optimal insider
trading strategy given an admissible pricing rule H∗ satisfying (3.7) and (3.8). Establishing the
rationality of the pricing rule H∗, on the other hand, is not so direct. Therefore, to set up the
stage for proving that the (H∗, θ∗) given in Theorem 3.1 is indeed an equilibrium, we first need to
demonstrate the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Consider the process Yt satisfying the stochastic differential equation
dYs =
Zs − Ys
Σz(s)− s+ σ2ds + dB
2
s ,
with
Zt = v +
∫ t
0
σz(s)dB
1
s ,
where B1t and B
2
t are two independent standard Brownian motions, v is N(0, σ) independent of
FB1,B21 and Σz(t) =
∫ t
0 σ
2
z(s)ds. Suppose that σ, σz(t) and Σz(t) satisfy Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1
and 3.2. Then, on the filtration F¯Yt , the process Yt is a standard Brownian motion and Y1 = Z1.
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Proof. Fix any T ∈ [0, 1). From Theorem 10.3 of [12] (note that, due to Assumption 3.1,
the conditions of the theorem are satisfied), we have that on the filtration
(FYt )t≤T the stochastic
differential equation for Y is
dYs =
ms − Ys
Σz(s)− s+ σ2 ds+ dB
Y
s ,
with
dms =
γs
Σz(s)− s+ σ2dB
Y
s ,
where BYt is Brownian motion on FYt , and γs satisfies the following ordinary differential equation
(ODE)
γ˙s = σ
2
z(s)−
γ2s
(Σz(s)− s+ σ2)2
with initial condition γ0 = σ
2.
Notice that γs = Σz(s) − s + σ2 is the unique solution of this ODE and initial condition.
Therefore on
(FYt )t≤T , the process Y satisfies
dYs =
BYs − Ys
Σz(s)− s+ σ2 ds+ dB
Y
s .
The unique strong solution of this stochastic differential equation on [0, T ] is Ys = B
Y
s (see [10],
Example 5.2.4). Hence, on the interval [0, 1), the process Y is a Brownian motion on its own
(completed) filtration. By continuity of Y , this process is a Brownian motion on [0, 1]. To prove
that Y1 = Z1, notice that
Y ∗t = Zt + λ(t)
(
−v +
∫ t
0
1
λ(s)
dB2s −
∫ t
0
σz(s)
λ(s)
dB1s
)
where λ(t) = exp
{
− ∫ t0 1Σz(s)+σ2−sds
}
.
Note that a random variable
∫ t
0
1
λ(s)dB
2
s −
∫ t
0
σz(s)
λ(s) dB
1
s is normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance
∫ t
0
1+σ2z(s)
λ2(s)
ds. Therefore, due to the Assumption 3.1 (and in particular condition (3.3)), if
limt→1
∫ t
0
1+σ2z (s)
λ2(s)
ds <∞, then Y1 = Z1.
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On the other hand, if limt→1
∫ t
0
1+σ2z(s)
λ2(s) ds =∞, consider the process
Xt =
∫ t
0
1
λ(s)
dB2s −
∫ t
0
σz(s)
λ(s)
dB1s ,
and a change of time τ(t) given by
∫ τ(t)
0
1 + σ2z(s)
λ2(s)
ds = t.
Then, Ws = Xτ(s) is a Brownian motion. Hence, we can use the law of iterated logarithm to get
lim sup
s→∞
Ws√
2s log log s
= 1
lim inf
s→∞
Ws√
2s log log s
= −1
or, in the original time,
lim sup
t→1
Xt√
2Ξ(t) log log(Ξ(t))
= 1
lim inf
t→1
Xt√
2Ξ(t) log log(Ξ(t))
= −1
where Ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
1+σ2z(s)
λ2(s)
ds. Since, due to the Assumptions 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2, we have
lim
t→1
λ2(t)Ξ(t) log log (Ξ(t)) = 0,
it follows that limt→1 λ(t)Xt = 0, therefore Y1 = Z1. 
With this lemma at hand, establishing that the pair (H∗, θ∗) given in the Theorem 3.1 is indeed
an equilibrium is straightforward, as the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied. Then the pair
(H∗, θ∗), where H∗(y, t) satisfies the partial differential equation (PDE) (3.7) with terminal condi-
tion (3.8), and the process θ∗t is given by (3.9), is an equilibrium.
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Proof. Due to Proposition 3.1, the θ∗t defined by (3.9) is the optimal trading strategy given
the admissible pricing rule H∗(y, t) which satisfies equation (3.7) and (3.8), if and only if: a) θ∗t is
continuous with bounded variation, and b) Y ∗t = θ
∗
t + B
2
t satisfies Y
∗
1 = Z1. Due to Lemma 3.1,
we have that θ∗t is continuous with bounded variation, and Y
∗
1 = Z1. Therefore θ
∗
t is an optimal
trading strategy given the pricing rule H∗(y, t).
On the other hand, due to the Lemma 3.1, for θ∗ given by (3.9), Y ∗ is a Brownian motion with
Y ∗1 = Z1. Therefore, the rational pricing rule given θ
∗ should be
H(y, t) = E
[
f(y +B21 −B2t )
]
.
This pricing rule satisfies the PDE (3.7) with terminal condition (3.8). Therefore, H∗(y, t) = H(y, t)
is a rational pricing rule. Hence, the pair (H∗, θ∗) given in this proposition is an equilibrium. 
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, we need to show uniqueness of the inconspicuous pricing
rule in H.
Proposition 3.3 The pricing rule H∗(y, t) which satisfies the PDE (3.7), with terminal condition
(3.8), is the unique inconspicuous pricing rule.
Proof. From Proposition 3.3 and Lemma 3.1, it directly follows that H∗(y, t) satisfying the
PDE (3.7) with terminal condition (3.8) is an inconspicuous equilibrium pricing rule. To prove
uniqueness, consider some equilibrium inconspicuous pricing rule H. By definition, there exists
a trading strategy θt ∈ A(H) such that the (H, θ) is an equilibrium, and the total order process
Yt = θt +B
2
t is a Brownian motion on FMt . By the definition of equilibrium,
H(Yt, t) = E
[
f(Z1)|FMt
]
= E
[
H(Y1, 1)|FMt
]
.
Since Yt is a Brownian motion on FMt , and given the definition of admissible pricing rule, H must
satisfy the PDE (3.7) with terminal condition H(y, 1) = h(y), for some nondecreasing function h
with E
[
h2(Y1)
]
<∞. Hence, to show uniqueness of H∗ we need to demonstrate that h = f almost
everywhere. Due to Proposition 3.1, it follows from the optimality of θ that f(Z1) = h(Y1) and,
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since θ is inconspicuous, Y1 ∼ N(0, 1). Since Z1 ∼ N(0, 1) by definition, one can have f(Z1) = h(Y1)
if and only if f = h almost everywhere, hence H∗ is indeed a unique inconspicuous pricing rule. 
4 Non Markovian equilibrium
In this section I address the problem of existence of an equilibrium given by Definition 2.3 in
the more general case of non Markovian pricing rule, i.e. I consider general weighting functions
w(t) satisfying Definition 2.2 thus allowing the market maker to assign different weights to the
information she receives.
As in the case of Markovian pricing rule, the existence of an equilibrium result is driven by the
existence of a finite upper bound on the informed agent’s value function, and the characterization
of the trading strategies which attain it. This characterization is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied. Then, given an admissible
pricing rule w(t) defined by (2.4) with σiy < σ
i+1
y for any i and (H,w) ∈ H with H satisfying the
partial differential equation
Ht(y, t) +
w2(t)
2
Hyy(y, t) = 0 (4.1)
an admissible trading strategy θ∗ ∈ A(H,w) is optimal for insider if and only if:
1. The process θ∗t is continuous and has bounded variation.
2. The weighted total order, ξ∗t =
∫ t
0 w(s)dθ
∗
s− +
∫ t
0 w(s)dB
2
s satisfies
hi
(
ξ∗ti
)
= H(ξ∗ti , ti) = F (Zti , ti) . (4.2)
Therefore, as in the case of Markovian pricing rule, the optimal strategy of the insider does not
alter quadratic variation of total order process, does not add jumps to it and is uncorrelated with it.
But, differently from the Markovian case, it follows from (4.2) that in this setting it is optimal for
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the insider to reveal her information not only at the market terminal time, but also in the interim
times whenever the market maker changes her weighting function.
Proof.
(Sufficiency) As in the proof of Proposition 3.1, for any admissible trading strategy we have
E
[
Xθ1
]
= E
[∫ 1
0
(F (Zs, s)−H(ξs−, s))dθs +
∫ 1
0
θs−dF (Zs, s) +
∫ 1
0
Fz(Zs, s)d [θ
c, Z]s
−
∫ 1
0
Hξ(ξs−, s)w(s)d [θ
c]s −
∫ 1
0
Hξ(ξs−, s)w(s)d
[
θc, B2
]
s
−
∑
s≤1
∆H(ξs, s)∆θs

 .
On the other hand, consider the functions
J i(ξ, z) =
∫ ξ∗(z)
ξ
(F (z, ti)−H(x, ti)) dx,
where ξ∗i (z) is the solution of H(ξ
∗
i (z), ti) = F (z, ti). For t ≤ ti let
V i(ξ, z, t) = E
[
J i
(
ξ +
∫ ti
t
w(s)dB2s , z +
∫ ti
t
σz(s)dB
1
s
)]
.
These functions are well defined (it is easy to check that E
[
|J i(∫ ti0 w(s)dB2s , Zti)|] <∞) and
satisfy the partial differential equation
V it (ξ, z, t) +
w2(s)
2
V iξξ(ξ, z, t) +
σ2z(t)
2
V izz(ξ, z, t) = 0
with terminal condition V i(ξ, z, ti) = J
i(ξ, z). Therefore, V i(ξ, z, ti) ≥ V (ξ∗i (z), z, ti) = 0 for
any fixed z and any ξ 6= ξ∗i (z). Moreover, since H(ξ, t) is a nondecreasing continuous function
of ξ, and due to the definition of an admissible pricing rule, we have
V iξ (ξ, z, t) + F (z, t)−H(ξ, t) = 0.
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Define the function V as
V (ξ, z, t) =
∑
i<n:t≤ti
(
1
σiy
− 1
σi+1y
)
V i(ξ, z, t) +
1
σny
V n(ξ, z, t)
Notice that, due to the properties of the functions V i, we have that V is well defined and
satisfies the partial differential equation
Vt(ξ, z, t) +
w2(s)
2
Vξξ(ξ, z, t) +
σ2z(t)
2
Vzz(ξ, z, t) = 0, (4.3)
with conditions V (ξ, z, ti) =
(
1
σiy
− 1
σi+1y
)
J i(ξ, z) + V (ξ, z, ti+) if i < n and V (ξ, z, tn) =
1
σny
Jn(ξ, z). Moreover, we have
Vξ(ξ, z, t) +
F (z, t) −H(ξ, t)
w(t)
= 0. (4.4)
As a consequence, we can express E
[
Xθ1
]
in terms of V as (notice that
∫ t
0
∫ u
0 w(s)dB
2
sdF (Zu, u)
is a martingale)
E
[
Xθ1
]
= E
[
−
∫ 1
0
Vξ(ξs−, Zs, s)w(s)dθs −
∫ 1
0
Vz(ξs−, Zs, s)dZs
−
∫ 1
0
Vzξ(ξs−, Zs, s)w(s)d [θ
c, Z]s −
∫ 1
0
Vξξ(ξs−, Zs, s)w
2(s)d [θc]s
−
∫ 1
0
Vξξ(ξs−, Zs, s)w
2(s)d
[
θc, B2
]
s
−
∑
s≤1
∆(w(s)Vξ(ξs, Zs, s))∆θs

 .
On the other hand, by applying the Itoˆ formula for semimartingales to V directly ([14],
Theorem II.6.33, p. 81) and removing martingale terms we get
E
[
Xθ1
]
= E
[
V (0, Z0, 0) −
n−1∑
i=1
(
1
σiy
− 1
σi+1y
)
J i(ξti , Zti , ti)−
1
σny
Jn(ξti , Zti , ti)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
Vξξ(ξs−, Zs, s)w
2(s)d [θc]s +
∑
s≤1
[∆V (ξs, Zs, s)− Vξ(ξs, Zs, s)∆ξs]

 .
22
Moreover, due to the properties of V we have
∑
s≤1
(∆V (ξs, Zs, s)− Vξ(ξs, Zs, s)∆ξs) ≤ 0, (4.5)
−
∫ 1
0
Vξξ(ξs, Zs, s)w
2(s)
2
d [θc]s ≤ 0, (4.6)
−J i(ti, ξti , Zti) ≤ 0. (4.7)
The above inequalities become equalities if and only if the following conditions hold: ∆θ = 0
for equation (4.5); [θc]1 = 0 for equation (4.6); H(ξ
∗
ti
, ti) = F (Zti , ti) for equations (4.7).
Therefore, we have that
E
[
Xθ1
]
≤ V (0, Z0, 0).
This expression holds with equality if and only if θ is continuous with bounded variation and
condition (4.2) is satisfied. Hence, if θ is such that these conditions are satisfied, then it is
optimal.
(Necessity) Consider the process given by
Xt = G(Zt, t) =
n∑
i=1
E
[
h−1i (F (Zti , ti))|FIt
]
1{t∈(ti−1 ,ti]}
with X(0) = E
[
h−11 (F (Zt1 , t1))|FI0
]
where h−1i is inverse of H(y, ti). This process is well
defined since H is an admissible pricing rule.
Consider the trading strategy given by θ0 = 0 and dθt =
∑n
i=1
Xt−ξt
σiy(ti−s)
1{t∈(ti−1 ,ti]}dt. In this
case, we can solve the stochastic differential equation for ξ on each interval [ti−1, ti] to get
ξt = Xt − (ti − t)
(
Xti−1 − ξti−1
ti − ti−1 +
∫ t
ti−1
1
ti − sdXs −
∫ t
ti−1
σiy
ti − sdB
2
s
)
.
Notice that ξt is finite almost surely, therefore θt has bounded variation almost surely. More-
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over, H(ξti , t1) = F (Zti , ti) almost surely, hence this choice of θ gives
E
[
Xθ1
]
= V (0, Z0, 0).
Since, by the sufficiency proof, we have that for any θ˜t which is either not continuous or does
not satisfy equation (3.10)
E
[
X θ˜1
]
< V (0, Z0, 0) = E
[
Xθ1
]
,
we know that any such θ˜t is not optimal.

From this characterization follows the existence of equilibrium result, as the next theorem
demonstrates.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that σz(t) and σ are such that there exists a piecewise constant function
g(t) =
∑n
i=1 αi1{t∈(ti−1 ,ti]} with 0 = t0 < . . . < tn = 1, 0 < αi < αi+1 for any i and
∑n
i=1 α
2
i = 1,
satisfying the following conditions:
Σz(t) + σ
2 −
∫ t
0
g2(s)ds > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]\{ti}ni=0, (4.8)
Σz(ti) + σ
2 −
∫ ti
0
g2(s)ds = 0 for all ti, (4.9)∫ t
ti−1
1(
Σz(s) + σ2 −
∫ s
0 g
2(u)du
)2ds < ∞ for all t ∈ [ti−1, ti) and any i ≤ n, (4.10)
lim
t→ti
∫ t
ti−1
1
Σz(s) + σ2 −
∫ s
0 g
2(u)du
ds = ∞. (4.11)
Then there exists an equilibrium and it is given by the weighting function w∗(s) = g(s), the pricing
rule H∗(ξ, t) = E
[
f
(
ξ +
∫ 1
t
g(s)dB2s
)]
, and the trading strategy θ∗t satisfying θ
∗
0 = 0 and
dθ∗t = 1{t∈(0,t1 ]}
(Zt − α1Yt)α1
Σz(t) + σ2 −
∫ t
0 g
2(s)ds
dt+
n−1∑
i=1
1{t∈(ti,ti+1]}
(Zt − Zti − αi+1 (Yt − Yti))αi+1
Σz(t) + σ2 −
∫ t
0 g
2(s)ds
dt.
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This theorem implies that if there are times ti such that Σz(ti) + σ
2 − ∫ ti0 w2(s)ds = 0, and the
intensity of private information arrival is fast enough at these points (i.e. (4.10) is satisfied), then
it is: a) rational for the market maker to change her weighting function at these points and b) it
is optimal for the insider to reveal her information at these times.
Moreover, notice that this equilibrium exists even when assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 insuring exis-
tence of Markovian equilibrium are not satisfied. That is, even if Σz(s) + σ
2 − s < 0 for some s,
there is a non Markovian equilibrium as long as there exists a piecewise linear increasing function
g, the integral of which is bounding the realized variance of the insider signal (Σz(t) − σ2) from
below and satisfies the conditions of the theorem.
The proof of this theorem relies on linear filtering and deterministic time change.
Proof. To demonstrate that ((H∗, w∗), θ∗) is an equilibrium, it is enough to show that
Y ∗t − Y ∗ti is a Brownian motion on [ti, ti+1] in its own filtration, (4.12)
where Y ∗t = θ
∗
t +B
2
t and
αi+1
(
Yti+1 − Yti
)
= Zti+1 − Zti . (4.13)
Indeed, if these two conditions are satisfied, since Σz(ti) + σ
2 − ∫ ti0 g2(s)ds = 0, we will have
that H∗(ξti , ti) = F (Zti , ti), therefore H
∗ is an admissible and rational pricing rule. Moreover, if
condition (4.12) is satisfied, then θ∗ is continuous with bounded variation. Therefore it follows from
Proposition 4.1 that θ∗ is optimal if condition (4.13) holds (notice that H∗ satisfies PDE (4.1)).
Thus, to show that Y ∗ satisfies (4.12) and (4.13) is the next goal. The proof is by induction.
I) Consider the interval [0, t1]. At t = 0 we have Y0 = 0, Z0 = v and Yt satisfies the following
stochastic differential equation on [0, t1]:
dYt =
(Zt − α1Yt)α1
Σz(t) + σ2 − α21t
dt+ dB2t
with dZt = σz(t)dB
1
t . From Theorem 10.3 of [12] (note that due to (4.10), the conditions of
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the theorem are satisfied), we have that on the filtration
(FYt )t<t1 the stochastic differential
equation for Y is
dYs =
(ms − α1Ys)α1
Σz(t) + σ2 − α21t
ds+ dBYs ,
with
dms =
γsα1
Σz(t) + σ2 − α21t
dBYs ,
where BYt is Brownian motion on FYt , and γs satisfies the following ODE
γ˙s = σ
2
z(s)−
γ2sα
2
1(
Σz(t) + σ2 − α21t
)2
with initial condition γ0 = σ
2.
Notice that γs = Σz(t) + σ
2 − α21t is the unique solution of this ODE and initial condition.
Therefore on
(FYt )t≤t1 , the process Y satisfies
dYs =
(
BYs − Ys
)
α21
Σz(t) + σ2 − α21t
ds+ dBYs .
The unique strong solution of this stochastic differential equation on [0, t1) is Ys = B
Y
s (see
[10], Example 5.2.4). Hence, on the interval [0, t1), the process Y is a Brownian motion on its
own (completed) filtration. By continuity of Y , this process is a Brownian motion on [0, t1].
To prove that α1Yt1 = Zt1 , notice that
α1Y
∗
t = Zt + λ(t)
(
−v +
∫ t
0
α1
λ(s)
dB2s −
∫ t
0
σz(s)
λ(s)
dB1s
)
where λ(t) = exp
{
− ∫ t0 α1Σz(t)+σ2−α21tds
}
.
Note that a random variable
∫ t
0
α1
λ(s)dB
2
s −
∫ t
0
σz(s)
λ(s) dB
1
s is normally distributed with mean 0
and variance
∫ t
0
α2
1
+σ2z(s)
λ2(s)
ds. Therefore, due to condition (4.9), if limt→t1
∫ t
0
α2
1
+σ2z (s)
λ2(s)
ds < ∞,
then ξt1 = α1Yt1 = Zt1 .
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On the other hand, if limt→t1
∫ t
0
α21+σ
2
z(s)
λ2(s) ds =∞, consider the process
Xt =
∫ t
0
α1
λ(s)
dB2s −
∫ t
0
σz(s)
λ(s)
dB1s ,
and a change of time τ(t) given by
∫ τ(t)
0
α21 + σ
2
z(s)
λ2(s)
ds = t.
Then, Ws = Xτ(s) is a Brownian motion. Hence, we can use the law of iterated logarithm to
get
lim sup
s→∞
Ws√
2s log log s
= 1
lim inf
s→∞
Ws√
2s log log s
= −1
or, in the original time,
lim sup
t→t1
Xt√
2Ξ(t) log log(Ξ(t))
= 1
lim inf
t→t1
Xt√
2Ξ(t) log log(Ξ(t))
= −1
where Ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
α2
1
+σ2z(s)
λ2(s) ds. Due to the conditions (4.8)-(4.11) in this case we have
lim
t→t1
λ2(t)Ξ(t) log log (Ξ(t)) = 0,
therefore it follows that limt→t1 λ(t)Xt = 0, thus ξt1 = α1Yt1 = Zt1 .
II) Suppose αj(Ytj − Ytj−1) = Ztj − Ztj−1 for any j ≤ i. Consider the interval [ti, ti+1]. At t = ti
we have ξti = Zti , and Y˜t = Yt − Yti satisfies the following stochastic differential equation on
[ti, ti+1]:
dY˜t =
(
Z˜t − αi+1Y˜t
)
αi+1
Σz(t)− Σz(ti)− α2i+1(t− ti)
dt+ dB2t
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with Z˜t = Zt − Zti , thus dZ˜t = σz(t)dB1t and Z˜ti = 0. From Theorem 10.3 of [12] (note
that, due to (4.10), the conditions of the theorem are satisfied), we have that on the filtration(FYt )t∈[ti,ti+1) the stochastic differential equation for Y is
dY˜s =
(
ms − αi+1Y˜s
)
αi+1
Σz(t)− Σz(ti)− α2i+1(t− ti)
ds+ dBYs ,
with
dms =
γsαi+1
Σz(t)− Σz(ti)− α2i+1(t− ti)
dBYs ,
where BYt is Brownian motion on FYt , and γs satisfies the following ODE
γ˙s = σ
2
z(s)−
γ2sα
2
i+1(
Σz(t)− Σz(ti)− α2i+1(t− ti)
)2
with initial condition γti = 0.
Notice that γs = Σz(t) − Σz(ti)− α2i+1(t − ti) is the unique solution of this ODE and initial
condition. Therefore on
(FYt )t∈[ti,ti+1), the process Y satisfies
dYs =
(
BYs − Ys
)
α2i+1
Σz(t)− Σz(ti)− α2i+1(t− ti)
ds + dBYs .
The unique strong solution of this stochastic differential equation on [ti, ti+1) is Ys = B
Y
s (see
[10], Example 5.2.4). Hence, on the interval [ti, ti+1), the process Y is a Brownian motion
on its own (completed) filtration. By continuity of Y , this process is a Brownian motion on
[ti, ti+1]. To prove that αi+1Y˜ti+1 = Z˜ti+1 , notice that
αi+1Y
∗
t = Zt + λ(t)
(∫ t
ti
αi+1
λ(s)
dB2s −
∫ t
ti
σz(s)
λ(s)
dB1s
)
where λ(t) = exp
{
− ∫ t
ti
αi+1
Σz(t)−Σz(ti)−α2i+1(t−ti)
ds
}
.
Therefore, due to conditions (4.8)-(4.11) we have, exactly as in the previous case, αi+1Y˜ti+1 =
Z˜ti+1 .
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By the principle of mathematical induction, conditions (4.12) and (4.13) hold for any i. 
5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that, in the presence of dynamic private information of the insider, and
under minimal restrictions on the admissible trading strategies, an equilibrium exists and there is
a unique Markovian pricing rule (as a function of total order process) that admits inconspicuous
equilibrium. Moreover, the optimal insider trading strategy is based on the market estimates of
the fundamentals, rather than on the stock price: the insider buys the stock when the market
overestimates the fundamental value, and sells it otherwise, thus leading to higher informativeness
of the stock price. Furthermore, this induces convergence of the price to the fundamental value
at the terminal time in the case of Markovian pricing rule and at some some set of times (which
include the terminal time) in the case of non Markovian pricing rule.
Future research can be conducted along the following directions: assumptions on the market
parameters could be further relaxed, and a more general model of the total order of the noisy
traders could be considered. The model can also be generalized further by allowing for potential
bankruptcy of the firm issuing the stock, with the time of bankruptcy defined as the random time
at which the underlying process governing the firm value hits a given barrier.
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A Proof of Remark 3.1
Suppose Assumption 2.2 is satisfied, limt→1 Ξ(t) = ∞ and conditions (3.3) and (3.4) hold. Then
L’Hoˆpital rule will give (notice that due to (3.4) and continuity of σz(t) in the vicinity of 1 we have
limt→1
(
1 + σ2z(t)
)
< 2)
lim
t→1
λ2(t)Ξ(t) log log (Ξ(t)) =
1
2
lim
t→1
(
1 + σ2z(t)
)
lim
t→1
(
Σz(t) + σ
2 − t) log log (Ξ(t)) .
Since by L’Hoˆpital rule we have
lim
t→1
λ2(t)Ξ(t) = 0,
it follows that
0 ≤ lim
t→1
λ2(t)Ξ(t) log log (Ξ(t)) ≤ 1
2
lim
t→1
(
1 + σ2z(t)
)
lim
t→1
(
Σz(t) + σ
2 − t) log log (λ−2(t))
=
1
2
lim
t→1
(
1 + σ2z(t)
)
lim
t→1
(
Σz(t) + σ
2 − t) log(∫ t
0
1
Σz(s) + σ2 − sds
)
=
1
2
lim
t→1
(
1 + σ2z(t)
)
lim
t→1
log(f(t))
f ′(t)
,
where f(t) =
∫ t
0
1
Σz(s)+σ2−s
ds and limt→1 f(t) = ∞. Since limx→∞ log(x)xα = 0, for any α > 0 we
need to show that
lim sup
t→1
fα(t)
f ′(t)
<∞ (A.14)
for some α > 0 to establish (3.6).
Consider any α ∈ (0, 1) and denote by
0 < g(t) =
fα(t)
f ′(t)
,
then for t ≥ t∗ we have
f1−α(t) = (1− α)
∫ t
t∗
1
g(s)
ds + c
where c is some positive constant. Due to this expression and since limt→1 f(t) = ∞, α < 1 and,
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due to (3.1) , f(t) <∞ for any t ∈ [0, 1) we must have
lim
t→1
g(t) = 0.
Thus (A.14) holds and therefore (3.6) is established.
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